In the 1990s, Islamic political violence escalated dramatically, frequently em-broiling broader publics in conflict. In Algeria, the civil war between a nebu-lous Islamic insurgency and the military-backed regime led to more than 120,000 casualties, including substantial civilian deaths. The brutality of the conflict, which included widespread massacres of women, children, and the elderly, captured international attention and raised concerns about the nature of Islamic activism. This violence was reproduced at lower levels throughout the Middle East, including Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Libya, the Sudan, and Egypt. At the same time, a transnational network of radical Salafis loosely affiliated with Osama bin Laden attacked U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Kenya, and Yemen. Bin Laden’s February 1998 fatwa (Islamic legal opinion) legitimizing attacks against U.S. military targets and civilians sparked nervous debates in Western circles about how to address rising lev-els of Islamic-sponsored terrorism, a debate given new urgency since the September 11 attacks. Outside the Middle East, Islamic groups engaged in violent forms of contention in China, South Africa, Eritrea, Kashmir, the Philippines, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Dagestan, redefining the geography of violent Islamic struggles.

Although radical tactics are at the fringe of Islamic movements, the growing use of violence in the 1990s raises important questions about Islamic ac-tivism and social movement contention. In particular, given the broad reper-toire of contention, which includes preaching, religious lessons, social and welfare services, publications, and general da’wa (religious proselytizing) ac-tivities, why did a number of Islamists turn to violence? More generically, why do social movements utilize violence as contention, given other tactics? What explains cross-national and diachronic variance in the level of violence?
In this chapter, we use the cycle of violence between Hosni Mubarak’s regime and the Gama’a Islamiyya in Egypt as a case study to explore some of these questions. Although episodes of Islamic violence have a history in Egypt, the most recent confrontations differ in scope. Running gun battles, bombings, assassinations, and ambushes claimed hundreds of lives between 1990 and 1998. Deaths included not only Islamists and agents of the state but also foreign nationals, intellectuals, civilians, and Coptic Christians. The cycle of violence culminated in the massacre of 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians by members of the Gama’a Islamiyya (henceforth Gama’a) in November 1997, shocking the entire nation, including the jailed leaders of the Gama’a who tried to distance themselves from the perpetrators. The attack marked the turning point in the low-intensity conflict, and the number of deaths attributed to Islamic violence declined precipitously. This pause (or end), in turn, provides an opportunity to look back at the previous decade to explain the explosion in violent Islamic contention and why social movements turn to radical tactics.

In contrast to popular views of Islamic radicals as fanatics engaged in irrational, deviant, unpredictable violence, we argue that violent contention is the result of tactical considerations informed by the realities of repressive contexts. Islamists engage in a rational calculus about tactical efficacy and choose modes of contention they believe will facilitate objectives or protect their organizational and political gains. Violence is only one of myriad possibilities in repertoires of contention and becomes most likely where regimes attempt to crush Islamic activism through broad repressive measures that leave few alternatives. In Egypt, the cycle of violence began largely in response to a broad crackdown on the Islamic movement that ensnared moderates, radicals, and a number of tangential bystanders. The crackdown included arrests, hostage taking, torture, executions, and other forms of state violence.

From this perspective, violent Islamic contention is produced not by ideational factors or unstable psychological mentalities but rather by exogenous contingencies created through state policy concerning Islamists. Particular Islamic groups may engage in violence irrespective of state actions, but the stability of tactics for these outlier groups cannot explain the overall level of violence nor its timing. Instead, we must examine the inputs into repertoire calculations that lead increasing numbers of activists toward the use of violence. This perspective does not entail an outright rejection of ideational explanations that focus on the ideology and beliefs of violent militants; rather, it serves as a corrective to long-standing traditions in research on Islamic activism that tend to highlight the role of ideational factors at the expense of structural imperatives and voluntarist dynamics. This study maintains that while it is tempting to blame Islamic activists for the outbreak of violence, exogenous factors, such as regime repression, hold some culpability.
Islamic Activism and Violent Contention

Despite the notoriety of violent episodes of Islamic contention, such as the Egyptian cycle of violence in the 1990s, there is surprisingly little empirical work on the subject. Most studies of Islamic activism instead examine the underlying causal factors that provide impetus for the emergence of an overall Islamic revival or resurgence. These include socioeconomic crises prompted by the failure of secular modernization projects (Dekmejian 1995; Faksh 1997); demographic pressures; the residual effects of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and concomitant foreign hegemony (Burgat and Dowell 1993; Keddie 1994); and the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel (Haddad 1992). Islamism is seen as an indigenously constructed response to the realities of everyday life, conditioned by housing shortages, rising unemployment, declining social services, rising prices, and a general sense of cultural, political, military, and economic weakness. From this perspective, deprivation has created a legion of disaffected recruits who seek culturally acceptable explanations that address their marginalization and social anomie (Ayubi 1980; Ibrahim 1980). Rooted in the shared symbols and language of Muslim societies, Islamism offers an appropriate weltanschauung and diagnostic framing for understanding and ameliorating difficult living conditions.

Although such studies point to the general conditions that give rise to Islamic movements, they do not effectively explain the emergence and proliferation of violence in repertoires of contention. In most cases, Islamic movements are not “born” violent. Instead, proponents of violence develop coteries of militants from within established, predominantly nonviolent Islamic movements. Groups such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria, the Gama’a of Egypt, and violent Salafi fringes in Jordan all emerged from broader mainstream Islamic movements. And while violent Islamic groups may represent constituent elements of a general reaction to intense crisis conditions, this does not in itself explain decisions to utilize violence rather than other mechanisms of collective action. What leads to shifts in repertoires of contention so that violence becomes an acceptable instrument of collective action within Islamic discourse? In a shared milieu, why do some Islamic groups turn to violence while others promote peaceful contention? And why do Islamic groups decide to use heightened violence at particular moments? To a large extent, the study of Islamic activism has been unable to effectively address these questions because of a tendency to favor the descriptive analysis of the textual sources, ideology, and social roots of Islamic groups that espouse violence at the expense of deeper sociological understandings about tactical choice.2

Since the Iranian Revolution, scholars have sought to explicate the under-
lying belief systems and demographic support of Islamic militancy, leading to
two loosely clustered approaches on the subject of Islamic violence. The first
is what we call “the ideational school.” According to this approach, the im-
mutable sources of the religion—the Qur’an and Sunna (traditions of the
prophet Muhammad)—inform decisions about behavior. According to a well-
trodden Islamic adage, unchanging religious principles and understandings
must be used to address new challenges and circumstances. As a result, vio-
lence becomes something rooted in the traditions and sources of Islam itself,
revived under particular circumstances that meet specific, religiously sanc-
tioned criteria. There is thus a certain degree of ideational constancy (Voll
1983; Sivan 1985; Vatikiotis 1987). More recent manifestations of this per-
spective embrace the multiplicity of religious interpretations that derive from
ambiguities in ideational sources, but still place ideology at the center of
analysis (Jansen 1986; Hafez 2000).

Despite the role of ideology in structuring behavior, radical Islamic groups
often demonstrate remarkable doctrinal flexibility in response to a changing
political environment. For example, despite popular perceptions of Hamas as
an uncompromising movement trapped by rigid adherence to dogma, the
movement has displayed doctrinal flexibility designed to enhance the move-
ment’s standing in the Palestinian community and its long-term viability in
the struggle against Israel. Before the intifada (uprising) that began in 2000,
there was growing popular support for the peace process, which posed a prob-
lem for the movement. Strict adherence and an intransigent position regarding
peace was likely to erode the support of bystander publics that sought
an end to the economic and social hardships of occupation, thus threatening
the organizational survival of Hamas as an alternative to Arafat and his sup-
porters. As a result, Hamas adjusted its doctrine to accommodate the possi-
bility of peace with Israel by framing peace as a temporary pause in the jihad
that would strengthen Muslim forces before a final assault. Concepts such as
sabr (patience) and hudna (truce) were used to legitimize doctrinal flexibility
within the overall objectives of the movement (Mishal and Sela 2000). Thus,
while ideology, beliefs, and text play a role, they may be subordinated to other
considerations under certain circumstances.

The second dominant approach, what Salwa Ismail (2000, 366) terms the
“psychosocial model,” privileges the socioeconomic background of violent ac-
tivists in analysis. Studies in this tradition seek to explain the emergence of
violent groups by understanding their demographic roots. Early research in-
dicated that most militants had high levels of education and had recently mi-
grated to urban centers, often in search of employment opportunities. Schol-
ars argued that because these recruits were cut off from their rural roots and
family and were living in a new urban environment with different values, they
suffered a sense of social alienation and anomie that rendered them vulnerable
to the Islamic message of tradition (S. E. Ibrahim 1980; Ansari 1984). Later
studies showed that the base of support shifted toward the less educated members of society, but recruits were still seen as motivated by psychosocial pressures (S. E. Ibrahim 1996). The underlying assumption of such an approach is that socioeconomic background tells us something about grievances and therefore why individuals join violent groups (Hoffman 1995).

The demographic profile of violent Islamists, however, tells us little about patterns of violence for a number of reasons. First, radicals and moderates seem to share many of the same characteristics, including levels of education. While violent militants tend to be younger, this alone does not explain why violence is used, since a number of young people also belong to peaceful movements. Second, demographic characteristics do not explain the variance of violence over time. Radical Islamic groups have not engaged in unending violent hostilities since their formation. Instead, there is an ebb and flow in the level of violence, and individuals choose to support and/or use violence at particular moments. Assuming that their socioeconomic background does not suddenly shift, and there is no evidence to indicate this, demographics alone cannot explain the choice.

Research on violent Islamists has thus failed to explain patterns of tactical choices or recognize the dynamic nature of repertoires of contention. Ideological orientation or background characteristics do not inexorably lead to violence; cross-national and internal group variance in the use of violence indicates otherwise. It is more effective to view violent activists as rational actors operating within a context of opportunities and constraints that inform decisions about appropriate tactics. We believe that only by accommodating the role of exogenous factors in structuring movement choices can social scientists fully explain the level and timing of Islamic violence. This is not to argue that beliefs or background characteristics are irrelevant, but rather that other theoretically relevant variables must be incorporated into our understanding of Islamic activism and violence as contention.

Political Opportunity Structure and Violent Contention

Social movement theorists have long emphasized the importance of exogenous factors on social movement behavior through the concept of “political opportunity structure,” which captures the myriad conditions propitious for the rise and growth of social movement contention. These conditions include the availability of allies (Gamson 1975; Jenkins and Perrow 1977), the nature of state repression (Tilly 1978; Brockett 1991; Smith 1991), the instability of elite alignments (Tarrow 1989, 1994, 1996), and the institutional strength of the state (Kriesi et al. 1992, 1995). An analysis of the political opportunity structure informs us of the broader context of opportunities and constraints under which movement actors seek to acquire and allocate resources for col-
lective action. The opportunities and constraints present in the political en-
vironment enter into the rational calculus of movement actors and help shape
intramovement debates over the efficacy and legitimacy of violence. Two as-
pects of the political opportunity structure, in particular, help shape deci-
sions regarding whether or not to rely on violent contention: accessibility of
the institutionalized political system and the nature of state repression.

Access to Institutionalized Politics

The institutionalized political system refers to the set of formal institutions
of the state—parliaments, government ministries, policy-implementing agen-
cies—and informal mechanisms, procedures, and “policy styles” (Kitschelt
1986, 63) by which the state elite governs. A political system is accessible to
the movement when the state grants it procedural and substantive access
through which it can exert formal or informal influence. It is inaccessible
when the movement lacks substantive access to formal and informal policy-
making channels, and thus lacks the possibility of influence over public policy
through state institutions.

System accessibility is important for investigating levels of violent conten-
tion because it bears directly on the question of reform versus revolution. An
accessible political system, as Jeff Goodwin (1997, 18) explains, “discourages
the sense that the state is unreformable or an instrument of a narrow class or
clique and (accordingly) needs to be overhauled.” Many studies have substan-
tiated the claim that the more accessible the state, even an authoritarian state,
the less likely it is to unify opposition behind a violent strategy (Huntington
1968; Skocpol 1979; Dix 1984; Goldstone 1991; Wickham-Crowley 1991). In
contrast, the more exclusionary and inaccessible the political system, the more
likely opposition will coalesce around a violent strategy (Goodwin and Skoc-
cubate’ radical collective-action: those who specialize in it tend to prosper,
because they come to be viewed by many people as more realistic and poten-
tially effective than political moderates, who themselves come to be viewed as
hopelessly ineffective.”

Recent history supports the contention that political access quells violent
rebellion. The Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions of 1979, for instance, were
made by a broad-based movement against “personalist authoritarian” regimes
characterized by “institutional detachment from the majority of the popula-
tion” (Farhi 1990, 32). Similarly, the Cuban revolutionary movement of 1959
engendered cross-national opposition to the state largely because Fulgencio
Batista’s regime was a personalistic, rather than collective, form of dictator-
ship. Martha Crenshaw’s (1978, 7–8) study of revolutionary nationalism in
Algeria points out that many of the leaders of the National Liberation Front
(FLN) at one point sought political office but were denied through fraud. In
contrast, revolutionary movements in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia
in recent history were unable to forge unified movements partly because elected governments “contributed greatly to the weaknesses of the revolutionary opposition since the reformist option seemed to provide the opposition with an alternative path” (Wickham-Crowley 1992, 170).

System inaccessibility, however, may be a necessary but insufficient cause for widespread and sustained violent contention. Much like economic deprivation, dictatorial regimes abound. Yet the levels of violence across illiberal polities vary. This fact has led many social movement theorists to look to the nature of state repression for a more complete explanation of violent contention.

The Nature of State Repression

Comparable to system accessibility, state repression is a palpable and often tragic way for a movement to gauge the tolerance limits of the political system. Indeed, despite ongoing disagreements over the dimensions of the political opportunity structure, very few scholars exclude the variable of repression from their analysis.

However, assessing the impact of repression on movement behavior is as difficult as it is important. Theoretically, there is little agreement regarding the logical consequences of state repression on movement behavior. Some contend that repression increases the cost of collective action so as to make it unlikely (Snyder and Tilly 1972; Hibbs 1973; Oberschall 1973; Oliver 1980; Hardin 1982). Others maintain that repression generates additional grievances that motivate further mobilization to punish an “unjust” opponent (Eckstein 1965; Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Goldstein 1983; White 1989). We reject these two perspectives on empirical grounds; there are many instances where repression both quells and provokes insurgency (Zimmermann 1980; Khawaja 1993).

Attempts to solve the paradox of the repression-rebellion nexus led some to investigate how varying levels of repression—too much or too little repression—are likely to induce protest or hinder it (Gurr 1970; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Muller 1985; Muller and Weed 1990). Others look to the timing of repression (Snyder 1976; Gurr 1986; Brockett 1995), its perceived illegitimacy (Opp and Roehl 1990), the institutional context under which repression is applied (Gupta, Singh, and Sprague 1993), the targeting of repression (Mason and Krane 1989), the consistency of repression in relation to accommodative strategies (Lichbach 1987), or a combination of these variables (Della Porta 1995a, 1996). These studies suggest that there are many dimensions to repression, each generating variables that could explain different outcomes. Therefore, rather than hypothesize the effect of repression per se, it is more useful to clarify some of the dimensions of repression and how they encourage or deter violent movement strategies.

There are at least two dimensions of repression that deserve careful atten-
tion: timing and targeting. The timing of repression refers to whether repression is applied preemptively or reactively. Repression is preemptive when it is applied before the opposition movement has had an opportunity to organize and mobilize disparate supporters and sympathizers around a common goal. Repression is reactive when it is applied in the ascendant phase of the protest cycle—that is, after activists gain organizational momentum (Brockett 1995). The targeting of repression refers to the range of targets encompassed under state repression (Mason and Krane 1989). State repression is selective when it only targets the leaders and core activists of the movement. It is indiscriminate when repression expands to include supporters, sympathizers, and ordinary citizens suspected of involvement in the movement.

The manner in which the state combines the timing and targeting of repression is a primary determinant of movement strategic calculations. We argue that preemptive and selective repression will deter violent contention on a mass scale, while reactive and indiscriminate repression is likely to encourage it. Preemptive repression predisposes the movement toward nonmilitant strategies for two reasons. First, preemptive repression denies activists the opportunity to rapidly expand material and organizational resources and thus disempowers supporters and sympathizers. They may wish to act but perceive few feasible means for effecting change. Uncertainty as to the power of the movement will force activists to become cautious and will deter supporters from backing radical groups who may appear overzealous or “ahead of their time.” “In the absence of organizational mobilization and support,” explains Khawaja (1993, 67), “potential activists are more likely to keep their anger and grievances to themselves, fearing retributions by authorities.” Brockett (1995, 132) illustrates this argument with reference to peasant mobilization in Guatemala in the mid-1960s and Nicaragua in the mid-1970s. The peasants in both cases, despite encountering widespread and arbitrary murders, shied away from revolutionary groups because the latter were “small and isolated from other political forces.” Peasant support for revolutionaries only came when political space for organized collective action opened during the 1970s, which facilitated more support groups and social networks.

Second, insurgency, especially in a highly repressive context, involves high-risk activities that require committed and trustworthy participants. “Recruitment is less risky when the recruiter can trust the recruit, and vice versa” (Della Porta 1988, 159). Commitment and trust beyond the core activists involved in initial organizing, however, usually develops through the actual process of mobilization. In other words, to induce rebellion on a mass scale, prior mobilization is necessary because it is in this phase that activists and supporters become acquainted with each other, gauge the level of commitment and numerical support in the movement, and develop bonds of friendship and camaraderie in organized settings. Many studies point out that the strongest incentive for recruitment into high-risk activities is
through friendship ties with someone who is already in the movement (Ger-
lach and Hine 1970; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980; Della Porta
1992; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). This observation is confirmed by Wick-
ham’s study of Islamist mobilization in Egypt, discussed in chapter 9 of this
volume. She notes that recruitment into Islamist networks was facilitated by
the fact that “most residents had a brother, cousin, friend, or neighbor in-
volved in Islamic prayer circles or study groups, and Islamist participants fre-
quently maintained close social relationships with nonactivist peers.” By de-
priving activists of the opportunity to repeatedly link with other activists and
supporters through mobilization, preemptive repression isolates militants
from their potential supporters and other political forces, raises doubt as to
the size of their support, and precludes the cultivation of high levels of com-
mitment and trust across the movement.

Reactive repression, on the other hand, predisposes the movement to rebel-
lion for three reasons. First, activists will have acquired material resources,
mainly through the expansion of membership contributions. This means that
activists encountering repression after a series of mobilizations will not only
become more aggrieved but will also command resources that can be used to
fight back.

Second, in contrast to preemptive repression, reactive repression comes af-

ter sympathizers and supporters have had a chance to develop trust and bonds
of friendship with the core activists of the movement as well as to realistically
gauge the level of support and commitment in the movement. If commit-
ment and support are deemed high, then supporters will feel empowered to
join insurgent organizations, act on their grievances, and try to bring about
change (Klandermans 1984; Opp 1988; Lichbach 1995; Kurzman 1996). As
Brockett (1995, 133) argues with reference to Central American revolutionar-
ies, repression of collective action in the ascendant phase of the protest cycle
encourages further protest because “the active opposition of large numbers of
people and of many organizations from many different sectors of society sus-
tains the belief that the regime will be defeated.”

Finally, reactive repression that seeks to eradicate an organized and mobi-
lized movement is more likely to induce mass rebellion than preemptive re-
pression because activists and supporters will seek to halt the loss of resources
accumulated over time. As Bayat (1997, 163) points out, “Extrakinship mobi-
lization and campaigning do not usually develop under repressive conditions,
unless the actors feel a common threat to their gains.” In other words, move-
ments will act not only because they are empowered but also because they may
believe that inaction will lead to the loss of hard-earned movement resources.
As Berejikian (1992, 652) explains, the “decisional determinant [to revolt] is
not the expected outcome, but how the choice is perceived relative to the
status quo (reference point).” If inaction entails continued losses, then there
will be a greater inclination toward risk to mitigate losses. Kriesi et al. (1995,
40) make a similar point: when repression threatens to considerably worsen the challengers’ ability to exert influence in the future, “the costs of collective action decrease relative to the now costly path of inaction.” In such circumstances, movement organizations may choose to fight back “even though it may be expected to accomplish little more than a continuation of the present situation or even a mere reduction of the expected deterioration.”

The targeting of repression—whether it is selective or indiscriminate—is also important. Selective repression predisposes the movement toward non-militancy while indiscriminate repression pushes it toward militant strategies. Selective repression signals to supporters and sympathizers that only “trouble-makers” will be punished, and therefore those who keep their distance will not become victims of repression. Moreover, selective repression is not likely to create “martyrs” out of uncommitted supporters. This does not mean that proponents of revolutionary violence will discontinue militancy, but it does mean that selective repression will deprive them of mass support, limiting the scale of their militancy. In chapter 3 of this volume, Lawson points out that support for violent contention in Bahrain during the 1990s was influenced by whether state repression was “selective” or “diffuse.” He shows that while selective targeting did not necessarily diminish protest, it did decrease the level of public support for acts of violence.

In contrast, indiscriminate repression antagonizes hitherto inactive supporters and sympathizers and intensifies the moral outrage of activists. Although selective repression could result in moral outrage and thus expand the legitimacy of the movement, indiscriminate repression is likely to do so many times over. A state that throws the net of repression widely is more likely to be viewed as illegitimate. Moral outrages committed by the militants of the movement will be seen as the “natural” response to indiscriminate repression. In his study of liberation theology movements in Latin America, Smith (1991) points out that brutal repression which targeted not only political parties, labor unions, and students but also many Catholics engaged in pastoral activities facilitated the development of insurgent consciousness and made possible the diffusion of “injustice frames” that motivated insurgency. Similarly, Gurr and Goldstone (1991, 334) and Kiernan (1996, 20–25) offer evidence that American punitive bombings of Cambodian and Vietnamese villages suspected of aiding rebels drove many peasants into the ranks of revolutionary armies. And Horne (1987, 104) shows that the French policy of “collective responsibility” during Algeria’s war of independence (1954–1962) expanded the membership of the rebellious National Liberation Front (FLN).

Furthermore, indiscriminate repression may push occasional activists and known supporters of the movement to seek the protection of violent groups. In a study of left-wing terrorism in Italy during the 1970s, Della Porta (1995b, 118) notes that “many of the new members of terrorist organizations
were in fact members of radical groups who joined terrorist organizations in order to have logistical support while evading arrest.” Similarly, Davis and Hodson (1982) and May (2001) show that many Guatemalan villagers joined guerrilla groups because the guerrillas came to be viewed as the only remaining source of defense against government-sponsored massacres that targeted innocent campesinos. And Mason and Krane (1989) correlate the expansion of peasant support for the El Salvadoran FMLN (Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front) during the late 1970s with the escalation of indiscriminate repression by government-sponsored death squads.

One of the paradoxes of state repression in response to social movement activism is that while governments often repress movements because of their potentially violent or destabilizing nature, the very act of repression creates a crisis and the conditions for violence (Melucci 1996, 303, 369). It is a collective action variant of the spiral of escalation in arms races where each side escalates its violent contention as a defensive measure while viewing opponent actions as offensive and provocative, thereby reinforcing perceptions about the need for continued violence.

In the following section, we show how the 1992 Islamic insurgency in Egypt was, at least in part, a response to a changing political opportunity structure. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the state increasingly blocked peaceful avenues of opposition and legitimized violent contention in the Islamic movement. In contrast to prevailing studies of Islamic violence, which imply that violence is endogenously produced as a result of either ideology or the socioeconomic characteristics of activists, the case of Egypt highlights how the degree of system accessibility and the nature of state repression play a large role in the decision to adopt violent forms of contention.

**Violent Contention in Egypt**

Islamic violence in Egypt has been a recurring phenomenon since the resurgence of Islamism in the 1970s. The 1981 assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat was a milestone in the history of sporadic violence between radical Islamists and the state. During the 1990s, however, Islamic violence took a distinct turn toward a more sustained insurgency. Between 1992 and 1997, there were 741 incidents of violence, which is in stark contrast to the 143 incidents that took place between 1970 and 1991. The years 1993 to 1995 were the bloodiest, witnessing almost daily incidents of violence. Whereas violence between 1970 and 1989 produced an estimated 120 deaths (Mubarak 1995, 374), violence between 1992 and 1997 resulted in 1,442 deaths and 1,779 injuries.

Islamic violence in the 1990s featured a number of attributes that distinguished it from earlier periods. Whereas violence in the 1970s and 1980s largely struck at “soft” targets—leftist students, Copts, “places of sin”—
violence in the 1990s targeted the state and its institutions much more than in previous periods, as evinced by attacks on policemen, security forces, and prominent government officials.5

Moreover, violence was characterized by greater sophistication as Islamists increasingly relied on high-tech explosives, intelligence gathering, and military training to better enable their units to inflict damage (Fatah 1995; Bakr 1996). In addition, for the first time since its inception, the Gama’a formed a clandestine armed wing with its own leadership separate from the da’wa wing.6 The decision to form an armed wing marked a clear shift in strategy from earlier periods when the Gama’a rejected clandestine work as both an un-Islamic innovation and a politically unsound strategy for building a mass movement (Mubarak 1995, 188).

Furthermore, in an unprecedented escalation, Islamic violence targeted tourists,7 the tourism industry,8 and various financial centers—principally state and foreign banks.9 Islamic violence was expansive, and Coptic Christians increasingly became targets. While estimates indicate that there were 20 violent incidents against Copts between 1982 and 1991, the years 1992 and 1993 alone witnessed 58 violent attacks against the Coptic community (Abulala 1998), and the attacks continued well into the late 1990s.10 Islamists also struck at secular intellectuals and ordinary civilians suspected of collaborating with security forces.11 Beginning in 1996, the Gama’a escalated its rhetoric against the United States, Israel, Jews, and “Crusaders.”12

The Islamic insurgency, however, was a relatively limited one, despite the significant increase in violence. It was largely confined to Upper Egyptian towns—Asyut, Aswan, Souhaj, al-Minya, Qina, and Beni Swayf—even though the Gama’a tried to expand its recruitment and attacks to Cairo (Mubarak 1995, 370–71; al-Din 1998, 506).

The turn to violent contention coincided with three important changes in the Egyptian political opportunity structure. First, Egypt witnessed the deliberalization of institutional politics in the 1990s. Second, the authorities in Egypt began to dismantle the network of the Gama’a in Upper Egypt after years of “permissive repression” that enabled them to foster organizational and societal gains. Finally, repression against the Gama’a was indiscriminate; it did not distinguish between core militants, sympathizers, and neutral observers. Each of these developments legitimized violent Islamic frames in the broader movement and thus made violent contention possible and sustainable.

**Political Deliberalization in Egypt**

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the Egyptian ruling regime took some tangible steps toward greater liberalization of the polity. Some previously banned parties were permitted to come back and participate in parliamentary elections, and the unsanctioned Muslim Brotherhood, the largest Islamic organi-
zation in Egypt since the late 1920s, was allowed to join legal parties and hold positions in the People’s Assembly (Ansari 1986; Hinnebusch 1985; Springborg 1989; Mustapha 1996; Korany 1998). To be sure, political liberalization in the late 1970s and 1980s did not give the Islamic movement substantive policymaking power in the political system. Nonetheless, many Islamists saw formal access to the system as a tangible gain because it provided a platform for Islamic agitation.

In the 1990s, the state reversed its liberalization stance and imposed greater restrictions on the opposition, especially the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The reversal began when the regime issued electoral law 206, which redrew (or gerrymandered) voting districts in a blatantly unfair way that privileged the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates. The ruling party continued to receive financial subsidies from the state, and it maintained its monopoly over the radio and television during election campaigns (al-Shourbaji 1994; Auda and Ibrahim 1995). These policies led the opposition, including the MB, to boycott the 1990 parliamentary elections. As a result, only 7 seats went to the official opposition, which is less than 2 percent of the seats. If we include the estimated 8 seats that went to independent Islamic candidates and 23 seats that went to independent candidates from the New Wafd, secular Labor, Liberal, and Nasserist Parties (38 seats, or a little over 8 percent), we still have a parliament that is proportionally less representative of the opposition than the 1979 one, which had allotted the opposition almost 11 percent of the seats (Zaki 1995, 94–96).

The 1995 elections resulted in a comparable outcome, but for entirely different reasons. The opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood, did not boycott the elections. However, before both rounds of the election, the state carried out a wave of arrests against hundreds of MB representatives and cadres to preclude them from running an effective campaign—indeed, to prevent their candidates from running altogether. Days before the elections, the state sentenced 54 members to prison terms ranging from three to five years (al-Shawkabi 1995). As a result, only 1 of the 150 MB candidates made it to the People’s Assembly, and he was removed in 1996 for membership in an illegal organization.

The lack of real opposition in the national assemblies of the 1990s meant that the legislature was in effect nothing more than a legal secretary to the executive, putting regime orders into proper legal form and doing so with due speed and no questions asked. One illustrative example of this subservience is Law 100 of 1993. This law regulated the elections of the professional associations purportedly to make them representative of their constituencies. In practice, however, it was widely perceived as a way of countering the hegemony of Islamists in the associations (al-Shourbaji 1994). The law stipulated, inter alia, that at least 50 percent of syndicate members must cast a vote for election results to be valid, a rule that hurt the Islamic movement, whose loyal
and organized cadres had previously taken advantage of low voter turnout in syndicate elections, which rarely exceeded 10 percent (Fahmy 1998). After news of the proposed law reached the opposition, it demanded input into the formulation of the measures. The government simply denied that such a law was in the making. On February 15, however, the law was proposed in parliament and enacted two days later. The speed with which the controversial law passed the legislature is a striking example of collusion between the legislative and executive against the opposition (Qandil 1995).

Four factors help explain the reversal in liberalization. First, during the 1980s, the MB took advantage of its national platform to raise its demands for Islamic laws and vociferously challenge the ruling regime's policies with regards to internal security, economic planning, foreign relations, use of torture, and the lack of democracy and human rights in Egypt (Radhi 1990/1991; al-Tawil 1992). By refusing to play a quiescent role in parliament, the MB challenged the legitimacy of the state regime. During the early 1980s, Mubarak wanted to consolidate his legitimacy by giving the opposition parties, especially the Islamists, an opportunity to express themselves through institutional channels while simultaneously enhancing the democratic image of the presidency, which had been tarnished by Sadat's excesses in the two years before his assassination. By the early 1990s, Mubarak was firmly in control and no longer needed to maintain an accommodative stance toward his most open and effective critics.

Second, while the political inclusion of the MB was intended to contain its influence, by the late 1980s the MB became the leading opposition force in parliament with 36 seats. Other political parties began vying for an alliance with the MB by Islamizing their discourse and political programs. In the 1987 “Islamic Alliance” that united the MB with the Labor and Liberal Parties, the MB was able to set the terms of the alliance. For example, it was able to exclude Marxists and Nasserists from the alliance list. It also enticed the Labor Party to amend its political program to include “applying the shari'a” atop its list of objectives (Auda and Ibrahim 1995, 310).

Third, the legitimacy of the MB in parliament spilled over into civil society. The MB began to expand its influence in professional associations of engineers, lawyers, and doctors. These syndicates became a vehicle for the expression of political aims and criticism of the regime's “impotence” at home and in foreign policy. They also allowed the MB to mobilize financial resources to aid social and political causes locally and abroad (Qandil 1995, 1996). Such influence was deemed threatening to the ruling regime because it turned the MB into an “alternative” to the state.

Finally, the inclusion of the MB did not result in the complete containment of the Gama'a. The state's strategy during the 1980s was to isolate the militants by rewarding the MB with political access. However, as we shall see below, mere formal inclusion of the MB in political institutions did not
placate the ideological radicals. To be sure, the Gama’a and Islamic Jihad shunned parliamentary participation on religious grounds. They believed democracy was heresy because it allowed people, not the “word of God,” to rule. Yet despite this fundamental objection, they did not hesitate to criticize the MB for its failure to advance Islamic aims through institutional participation. Aboud Zumur, the leader of Islamic Jihad, chided the MB for failing to secure a political party during the 1980s by pointing out that “whereas France, Germany, and Italy permit the formation of a religious party, Egypt is proud of the fact it does not permit such a party” (quoted in Ahmed 1995, 109). More significantly, the ideological radicals accused the MB of legitimating the regime and dividing the Islamist movement. According to Aboud Zumur, “The government carefully responds to some of the limited demands of Islamists inside of the [People’s] Assembly to fulfill its containment conspiracy to the point of convincing Muslims that there is a possibility of applying Islamic law through the assembly” (quoted in Ahmed 1995, 287).

In a document by Islamic Jihad entitled Falsaṭ al-Muwajaha (The Philosophy of Confrontation), Tariq Zumur wrote: “The goal of permitting Islamists to enter the People’s Assembly is nothing more than an attempt to drag a wide section of the youth behind a course of action in which the path (of the movement) is lost and its goals concealed. The presence of Islamists inside the regime’s legislative assembly bestows upon the regime legitimacy it never dreamed of. The mere direction of Islamists toward the ballot box guarantees the fulfillment of [the state’s] goal” (quoted in Mubarak 1995, 355).

As the formal inclusion of the MB during the 1980s turned into outright political exclusion in the early 1990s, the Gama’a and Islamic Jihad felt vindicated in their assessment of the political strategy of the state. In one communiqué, the Gama’a rhetorically asked, “What has the Muslim Brotherhood, since its inception until now, achieved of the goals and objectives of Islam, the hopes and needs of the Muslims, and the duties and requirements of the age?” It added, “What is astonishing is that every time the Muslim Brotherhood rushes to issue their statements of moral condemnation, denunciation, and disavowal of all that is jihad—they call it terrorism—the more the government redoubles its constraints against them and strikes them non-stop.” In its publication al-Mujahedin, Islamic Jihad wrote, “All the peacefulness and gradualism upheld by the [Muslim Brotherhood] during their political struggles, and their work through the regime’s legitimate, legal channels did not save them from being handcuffed, tried in front of military courts, and dragged to prisons. All the while their preachers declare that they will not be provoked and will not attempt confrontation.”

The inability of the legal and semilegal opposition to effect major political changes gave the radicals, as they saw it, added justification for violent contention. The demands of the opposition in the early 1990s reiterated the demands of the early 1980s: application of Islamic law, electoral reforms, repeal
of the state of emergency imposed after Sadat’s assassination, an end to mass arrests and torture, and respect for political freedom and human rights. The repetition of the demands highlighted the limited political progress of the opposition over the past several decades. As Ahmed (1995, 287) explains, “The inability of the Muslim Brotherhood to achieve substantial political gains during the two parliamentary experiences of 1984 and 1987 resulted, on the one hand, in a loss of support for the Muslim Brotherhood and, on the other, an intensification of the jihadist’s criticism toward them. It also consolidated the jihadist’s conviction in their rejectionist position toward parliamentary work and predisposition toward greater reliance on violence.”

The deliberalization of the political system in the 1990s was a necessary but not sufficient cause for the cycle of violence that began in 1992. The nature of state repression, particularly the reactive and indiscriminate application of repression, contributed to the legitimization of violent contention in the Islamic movement as well.

Reactive State Repression

In the 1980s, as the Islamic movement gained social momentum, the state adopted what Hisham Mubarak (1995, 382) aptly terms a policy of “permissive repression” (al-tasamuh al-qum’ai). This policy aimed to contain militant Islamists in their Upper Egypt strongholds by acquiescing to some of their organizational activities while repressing more outwardly confrontational behavior.

During the 1980s, the Gama’a branches were allowed to hold regular conferences and meetings around their mosques, and the gatherings were often overtly political and critical of the state and “enemies” of Islam. During the meetings, the Gama’a employed its own security guards and drew a large number of supporters. As Mubarak (1995, 257) points out: “The Gama’a was the only political force in Egypt that conducted mass conferences without acquiring a security permit as the law declares, not to mention the repetition of slogans, declarations and words that represented a violation of and a challenge to the law. Meanwhile, security men—at that time—could not come near conference areas for fear of clashing with the Gama’a’s paramilitary groups, which were given the task of ‘protecting’ the conferences.”

The Gama’a was even able to establish “liberated zones” in some of the towns of Upper Egypt and Greater Cairo (Mubarak 1995; Bakr 1996). In the Asyut city of Dairut, the Gama’a controlled approximately 150 mosques, and in some neighborhoods they imposed complete control. In the 1980s, the Gama’a began expanding into the shantytowns and peripheral areas of Cairo—Ain Shems, al-Zawiyya al-Hamra, Imbaba, and Boulaq al-Dakrour. In a place like Imbaba, where the Islamists nearly established an “Islamic republic,” the Islamists hardly encountered any repression. As one Gama’a activist
in Imbaba relates, “Our work was conducted and expanded without any security provocations or intervention from the security apparatuses, which gave us a better opportunity to grow. After a short while the Gama’a al-Islamiyya became an influential force in Imbaba and everyone took it into account” (quoted in Mubarak 1995, 247).

The Gama’a established roving bands that often engaged in “forbidding vice”—segregating the sexes, preventing girls from engaging in sporting activities at schools, and breaking up concerts (Ramadan 1995, 241). The movement also regularly enforced its own laws through threat and force at the universities of Upper Egypt, something it began doing in the 1970s (Springborg 1989, 228). Just as important, the activities of the Gama’a against the Copts went largely unpunished so long as it did not rise to an “alarming” level—that is, to a level that attracted national and international press attention. This was especially the case in Dairut, where there were repeated incidents of sectarian violence (see Egyptian Organization for Human Rights 1992).

The acquiescence of the state to Islamic activism in Upper Egypt also extended to social services. The Gama’a organized social welfare services that operated out of the movement’s mosques to help impoverished communities. These activities included distributing meat and rice during religious holidays and passing out school supplies and clothing to poor families at the beginning of each school year. They also set up “reconciliation committees” to mediate conflicts in neighborhoods on the basis of Islamic laws (Mubarak 1995, 260–65). Because the Gama’a made it a point to publicize these activities to enhance its legitimacy in the community, the authorities were well aware of what the Gama’a was doing.

But this policy of permissive repression had limitations, and, eventually, escalating provocations prodded the state to intervene and limit the power of the Gama’a. In 1990, the state responded to the growing strength of the Gama’a by assassinating ‘Ala Muhyi al-Din, the movement’s official spokesman. The Gama’a retaliated by forming an armed wing of preexisting security groups and by assassinating Rifa’at al-Mahjoub, former speaker of parliament (Mubarak 1995). Mahjoub’s assassination led to massive sweeps in Asyut, Cairo, and Beni Swayf, among other places, which resulted in hundreds, if not thousands of arrests. The only comparable sweep occurred in May 1987, when thousands were picked up immediately after the attempted assassination of former interior minister Hasan Abu Basha.

A shift from a policy of permissive repression to one that favored the elimination of the Gama’a in Upper Egypt accelerated dramatically in 1992 following several critical events: clashes between Muslims and Christians in Manshiyat Nasir in Upper Egypt in March, where at least 13 people were killed; the assassination of the prominent intellectual Faraj Fuda in June 1992; and attacks on tourists (also in June).

In May 1992, the state deployed 2,000 soldiers in the Asyut district of
Dairut to impose a curfew after a series of demonstrations and clashes between Islamists and the police. A month later, a state of emergency was declared in some areas of Asyut. In November 1992, the authorities declared their intention to speed up the closure of private mosques, and in December 1992 the state sent 16,000 soldiers to “liberate” Imbaba in Greater Cairo. In January 1993, 8,000 soldiers sought Islamists in Masarah, Dairut, Sanaba, Manshiyat Nasir, and Dairut al-Sharif. In April 1993, an additional 5,000 soldiers were deployed in Asyut.16

The attempt to uproot the militants of the Gama‘a was reactive and somewhat late. As one Egyptian analyst noted, “Since the emergence of the phenomenon [of violence] in Egyptian society in 1991, and even until 1993, it is possible to say that the security apparatus had no strategy. It dealt with events individually without linking them together and without forming a single political agenda to deal with [Islamic violence]” (Markaz al-Dirasat al-Istratijyya ¤ al-Ahram 1995b, 425). Another observer comments that it was with the “liberation” of Imbaba in late 1992 and early 1993 that the state began developing a comprehensive strategy against Islamic violence (see al-Wasat, no. 60, March 22, 1993).

But after a decade of organizing social and political networks in Upper Egypt, the Islamists had the capacity to fight back. Just as important, the Gama‘a had much to lose if it did not fight the state’s attempt to roll back its organizational and societal gains. By 1992, the state was bent on depriving the Gama‘a of its mosques, informal associations, and, as the insurgency developed, lives. In short, the Islamic insurgency of 1992 may well have been as much a defensive as an offensive strategy. And the indiscriminate nature of state repression gave Islamists further justification to rebel (Hafez 2003).

**Indiscriminate State Repression**

Islamic militancy in the 1990s did not produce a targeted state response. Instead, repression was brutal, swift, and indiscriminate. State repression encompassed not only the hard-core militants of the Gama‘a and Islamic Jihad, but also supporters, sympathizers, families, and, for that matter, anyone wearing a beard with a trimmed moustache (see Human Rights Watch 1993; Amnesty International 1996). The arrest numbers in the 1990s indicate that the state threw its net too widely.17 Between 1992 and 1997, more than 47,000 people were arrested, a number that is surely greater than the number of active militant Islamists. It was only in 1998 and 1999 that the state released more than 7,000 of these prisoners in response to the cessation of violence (see al-Hayat, April 27, 1999).18

In addition to mass arrests, the regime began using “hostage taking,” whereby they detained the families and relatives, especially the wives, of sus-
pected militants until the militants turned themselves over to the authorities (see Human Rights Watch 1995). Those arrested were regularly mistreated and tortured. As suggested previously, torture was not a new phenomenon in Egypt. What distinguished it in the 1990s was its indiscriminate application.

In addition to being indiscriminate, state repression was heavy-handed. For the first time since 1981, the state began referring Islamists, including those from the Muslim Brotherhood, to military courts, where “justice” was delivered hastily and without an appeal process. For example, in early June 1994, five defendants were brought to a military court to face capital charges. By mid-July 1994, they were found guilty and sentenced to death. They were executed in late August.

In the mid-1990s, the state increasingly adopted a shoot-to-kill policy, as evinced by the decline in the number of Islamists “injured” and the increase in the number of Islamists “killed.” The policy had a self-fulfilling dynamic because Islamists began to fight back.

Insurgents cited mass arrests, hostage taking, and torture by the authorities as the main reasons for the rebellion of 1992. In one of its documents, Hawla al-Muqif al-Rahin bayna al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya wal-Nizam al-Misri (Concerning the Current Situation between the Islamic Group and the Egyptian Regime), the Gama’a cites the following reasons for the increase in violence since 1992:

1. The storming of mosques controlled by the Gama’a.
2. The execution of some of the leaders of the Gama’a.
3. Torture of Gama’a members under arrest.

The document goes on to say that the Gama’a operated “peacefully” and limited its activities to holding conferences, distributing leaflets, and protest and strikes until the regime decided to eliminate it. In another document, Hata Mata (How Long), issued in July 1991, the Gama’a argued that the main reason for the violence was the imprisonment of Islamists and their “torture and the torture of their wives and mothers that has become a daily habit in police branches and in the buildings of the central state security investigators.”

The fact that repression was indiscriminate gave added incentive to hitherto uncommitted activists to join the ranks of militants, either as a way to evade long prison sentences and torturous confinement or to take revenge against an “iniquitous” state that unfairly punished them and their families. H. T. Ibrahim (1996, 412–13) aptly sums up the effect of indiscriminate repression on Egyptian Islamists: “The logical consequence of the randomness in applying security measures in some areas was to create tensions between the public and the agencies of the police. In the midst of conducting a sharp confrontation with some of the Islamic groups, these agencies did not re-
ceive the sympathy of the public, which did not provide them a truly helping hand . . . [Likewise,] the politics of arresting the wives and relatives of fugitives and taking them as hostages aided in inculcating the spirit of revenge between security agents and [the Islamic] groups."

Conclusion

Violent contention in the Egyptian Islamic movement became an increasingly acceptable protest repertoire in the 1990s due to three developments relating to the political opportunity structure. First, the deliberation of the political system, after some tangible albeit limited progress in the 1980s, set the context for a delegitimized ruling government bent on limiting access to institutional contention. The inability of moderate Islamists to expand their political influence through state institutions during the 1990s gave the message of revolutionary Islamists empirical credibility. Second, the reactive nature of state repression against militant Islamists in Upper Egypt meant that Islamists had the organizational means to fight repression. It also meant that Islamists had organizational and societal gains worth protecting. Finally, indiscriminate repression gave Islamists added justification to rebel, as indicated by their communiqués and pamphlets. Indiscriminate repression meant that nonrebellion was no guarantee against state persecution. It also allowed the "injustice frames" promoted by insurgents to resonate with the broader Islamic field.

The case of Egypt highlights the necessity of focusing on exogenous political conditions that are propitious for violent contention. Contrary to prevailing ideational and socioeconomic perspectives on Islamic violence, the ideology and demographic backgrounds of militant Islamists are insufficient to explain the decision to rely on violence as a means to an end. As the case of Egypt illustrates, violent contention was a reaction to predatory state policies that threatened the organizational and societal gains of a movement, as well as a defensive reaction against an unpredictable future created by indiscriminate repression.

The case of Egypt also highlights the importance of investigating political violence, especially Islamic political violence, as a component of social movement theory. Violence in the Egyptian Islamic movement was not the domain of a marginal terrorist group. It was adopted by one of the major actors in the movement, one that organized social services, recruited members, and had adherents in several of Egypt’s towns and cities. Moreover, the Gama’a was not born violent, but developed in that direction due to the political opportunity structures that prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s. The probability of future Islamic rebellions in the context of resurgent Islamism across the Muslim world points to the need for greater theoretical attention to Islamist violence by social movement theorists.
Notes

1. For an explanation of the end to the heightened violence, see Gerges (2000).
2. This tendency is represented in an array of descriptive publications that outline the structure and history of various radical groups and episodes of violence without comprehensively elucidating tactical choices (e.g., Rubin 1991; Kepel 1993; Martinez 2000).
5. Some of the prominent government officials who were subject to assassinations and assassination attempts are Atif Sidqi (prime minister), Hasan al-Alfi (minister of interior), Safwat al-Sharif (minister of information), and President Mubarak in Adis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1995.
6. The decision to form an armed wing was taken in late 1990, after a series of mosque raids by security forces and the assassination of ‘Ala Muhyi al-Din, the official spokesman of the Gama’a, in September of that year (Mubarak 1995, 399–400). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Gama’a, under the pretext of fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan, sent some of its leaders and activists to set up training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan to instruct militants in guerrilla and clandestine warfare (al-Hayat, September 25, 1999).
7. The Gama’a also repeatedly claimed responsibility for attacking tourists. See its communiqués in al-Hayat (October 1, 1994, and April 21, 1996).
8. The Gama’a repeatedly issued communiqués declaring responsibility for attacking tourist sites and trains. See al-Hayat (February 24, 1994; March 10, 1994; January 18, 1995; and November 10, 1995).
10. The Gama’a did not regularly claim responsibility for attacks on Copts, but it did not deny them or condemn them until two gruesome massacres took place in 1997. The first was in Abu Qarqas on February 12, when nine Coptic Christians were gunned down during prayer services. The second was on March 13 in Naj Dawud, where 13 Copts were killed (New York Times, March 15, 1997). See communiqués denying responsibility in al-Hayat (February 16, 1997, and March 16, 1997). The denials of the Gama’a were not consistent. In one communiqué it denied all responsibility; in another it said misguided youth within the Gama’a, lacking proper leadership due to the arrest of their leaders, were behind the attacks.
11. Among the notable intellectuals to come under attack were Faraj Fuda, an outspoken critic of Islamism killed in June 1992, and Najib Mahfouz, a Nobel Prize-winning novelist wounded in October 1994. Threats were also issued against intellectuals and entertainers: former Judge Said al-Ashmawi, feminist writer Nawal al-Sadawi, writer and professor Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid, and actor Adel Imam. For the killing of “collaborators,” see al-Hala al-Diniyya fi Misr (1995, 191, and 1998, 241).


13. For a detailed account of the interference encountered by the Muslim Brotherhood candidates and cadres, see Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (1995).


15. The article was quoted at length in al-Hayat, January 28, 1996.


17. The data for 1992–1994 were gathered from Ahmed (1995, 299–305); the 1995 figure was taken from Abulala (1998); the 1996 figure was taken from al-Hala al-Diniyya fi Misr (1998, 241); the 1997 figure was taken from Taqrir Misr al-Mahrous wal-Dalam, 1997 (1998).

18. The release of 7,000 prisoners within two years after the end of the insurgency indicates that the state had arrested many people on the mere suspicion of being militant.


Works Cited


Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement

87


Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


